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NOTES
Charitable Remainder Trusts-A Need for Further
Reform?
I.

INTRODUCTION

The Tax Reform Act of 1969 replaced the loosely structured charitable remainder trust with a more formalized tripartite arrangement
consisting of the annuity trust, unitrust, and pooled income fund. The
changes were designed to eliminate uncertainties in valuing the charitable remainder, which usually arose from discretionary accounting, investment, and invasion of corpus powers given to the trustee, and were
intended to provide a better correlation between the amount of the
charitable deduction and the value of the interest ultimately received by
charity. As is often the case with new revenue legislation, however, it is
questionable whether the desired results have been attained. Moreover,
the difficulties of implementing the new law are revealed by the absence
of finalized Treasury Regulations in every area except the pooled income fund. Several uncertainties regarding the recent legislation therefore continue to exist among writers and estate planners, raising doubts
about both its requirements and its effectiveness. The 1969 changes
regarding charitable remainder trusts presumably were intended as a
panacea, but an analysis of their effectiveness indicates that further
modifications may be necessary.
This Note will consider first the charitable remainder trust as it
existed under the law prior to 1969, along with recent litigation involving such trusts. Secondly, the specific legislative changes will be set out
and an examination made of situations in which the designated purpose
of these changes apparently has not been achieved. Following a consideration of several problems that remain unresolved by the 1969 Act and
the current regulations thereunder, there is a discussion of the criticism
directed at the new law from a policy standpoint, which points up the
need for a continued re-evaluation of the law in this area. Finally, there
are some proposed changes that seek to retain the familiarity and to
eliminate the weaknesses of charitable remainder trust law prior to
1969.
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RECENT LITIGATION UNDER PRE-1969 LAW

A.

The Legal Framework

In the usual charitable remainder trust drafted before the Tax Reform Act of 1969 [hereinafter referred to as the 1969 Act] became law,
the grantor made an indirect charitable contribution by leaving property
either under an inter vivos or a testamentary trust to provide income to
private individuals for a period of time with the remainder to go to a
charity. A charitable deduction from federal income, estate, and gift
taxes generally was available for the remainder interest. The amount of
the deduction was based on the present value of the remainder interest.
This value is determined by first using actuarial life expectancy tables
and an assumed rate of return to compute the value of the income
beneficiary's interest and then subtracting that amount from the total
amount transferred in trust.
In paying the trust income to a private beneficiary, the trustee was
often given the power to invade corpus in favor of this beneficiary. The
existence of such power created considerable controversy over what
circumstances should exist before the charitable remainder could be
valued accurately and a deduction could be granted. The basic test under
the law prior to the 1969 Act was whether the value of the charitable
remainder interest was "presently ascertainable" when the transfer in
trust was made.' In order for the value of a charitable remainder of a
trust in which the trustee was given power to invade corpus to be presently ascertainable, definite conditions or standards governing the trustee's power had to be incorporated in the will or instrument of transfer.
The courts then considered the language of the governing instrument to
determine whether the standards provided would adequately restrict the
trustee's discretion. If the standards were found to be sufficiently definite, the power of invasion could be overlooked and the deduction determined as though such power did not exist. Improbability of actual
invasion, perhaps because of additional income to the noncharitable
beneficiary from sources other than the charitable remainder trust, became a determinative factor only if the transfer instrument was found
to have set a definite standard for invasion. This form of charitable
giving and the tests for allowing deductions for such gifts are reflected
in a plethora of current litigation under the pre-1969 law governing
I. For good general discussions of the application of this test see Morrison & Marcus, Estate
Planning Considerationsfor Charitable Trusts and Charitable Remainder Trusts under the Tar
Reform Act of 1969, 75 DICK. L. REV. 185, 203-09 (1971); Warm, "AscertainableStandard":Its
Use and Misuse in Charitable Trust Remainders, 31 J. TAX. 32 (1969); 46 N.C.L. REV. 168 (1967).
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charitable remainder trusts.
A discussion of these cases is relevant since many unsettled estates
will be affected by the 1969 Act's provision for a deduction under pre1969 rules for estates of decedents whose wills were executed before
October 9, 1969, if the decedent dies prior to October 9, 1972. Consequently, the principles of these decisions will assist lawyers who, .for the
next several years, will be engaged in litigation regarding deductions for
charitable remainder trusts drafted under the old law. Finally, if the
1969 changes prove unsatisfactory, and Congress decides to make further changes, there may be a shift back to some form of the charitable
remainder trust as it existed prior to the 1969 Act. For these reasons, a
review of the recently decided cases should be helpful.
In determining whether powers granted to a trustee make the value
of a charitable remainder presently unascertainable and thus destroy the
deduction, the courts generally rely on two basic factors: (1) the language of the trust instrument and (2) state trust law doctrines and
practices regarding the duties of a fiduciary. The ensuing discussion of
recently decided cases, therefore, rather than providing a detailed analysis of each opinion, will focus on the courts' consideration of these two
factors.
Because of variously worded powers to invade and investment
clauses among trust instruments, the axiom that "each case must be
examined on the basis of its special facts" is particularly applicable to
the case law involving charitable remainder trusts prior to the 1969 Act.
Significant, but sometimes subtle, differences in the governing instruments preclude the adoption of a polarized position that broad administrative powers either always or never prevent the charitable deduction.
Moreover, the applicable state trust law dictates the fiduciary obligations of the trustee of a charitable remainder trust and thus imposes
limitations on the extent of the powers granted him by the trust document.' Consequently, as variously worded trust instruments governed by
the laws of different states are considered by the courts, the inevitable
result is a group of decisions whose variety is necessitated by the assorted factual situations under which they arose. Moreover, as the law
is applied to the facts, a difference in judicial attitudes toward the extent
to which flexibility in the administration of trusts will be permitted
without disallowance of the charitable deduction is revealed in the current litigation in this area.
2. E.g., Peoples Trust Co. v. United States, 311 F. Supp. 1197, 1199 (D.N.J. 1970): "No
court in New Jersey would permit the trustee to so use its power to deplete trust corpus in order
to benefit the life beneficiary."
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Cases Denying the CharitableDeduction

In three companion cases decided by the Fifth Circuit, the taxpayers were denied estate and gift tax deductions for charitable remainders.
In FloridaBank v. United States,3 the trustee was required to pay over
capital gains produced by the trust corpus to the life beneficiaries. Normally, capital gains are considered increments of corpus and cannot be
allocated to the income account.' Because of this mandatory provision
in the decedent's will, as opposed to a clause merely granting the trustee
the power to distribute capital gains, the court found that the question
whether the trustee actually did realize capital gains was insignificant.'
Without making any reference to the trustee's fiduciary duty under state
trust law, the court concluded that the directive to the trustee precluded
a determination that the charitable beneficiaries would receive an
amount equal to the claimed deduction.'
7
The trustees in Miami Beach FirstNational Bank v. United States
were authorized to invest in investment trusts, were required to designate capital gains distributions from mutual funds as income, and were
empowered in their sole discretion to allocate to income or principal all
receipts and expenses! The court found that the first two of these powers would constitute an invasion of corpus to the extent that current
dividends from investment trust or mutual fund shares would include,
for example, any gains received by an investment trust upon the disposition of its underlying investments, if all dividends were considered as
income by the trustees The court stated that the powers regarding
investments and treatment of dividends as well as the authorization to
charge expenses against corpus were iot, if exercised, limited by the
principles of fiduciary management under Florida law. 0 The Fifth Circuit therefore reversed the trial court and held that the possibility of a
significant reduction of corpus resulting from the exercise of the above
powers precluded the granting of a charitable deduction.
A will giving trustees the power to charge disbursements against
3. 443 F.2d 467 (5th Cir. 1971).
4. UNIFORM PRINCIPAL AND INCOME ACT, § 3(b)(1) (1962 version).
5. 443 F.2d at 473.
6. Id.
7. 443 F.2d 475 (5th Cir. 1971).
8. Excerpts from the provisions in the trust instrument, describing the trustee's powers in
detail, are set forth in the text of the opinion. Id. at 476-77.
9. Id. at 478, citing the position of the Internal Revenue Service on mutual funds as set out
in Rev. Rul. 385, 1960-2 CUM. BULL. 77. This position is discussed and criticized in Morrison &
Marcus, supra note I, at 207-08.
10. 443 F.2d at 479.
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principal or income, treat liquidating dividends as income, and buy
bonds and other securities at a premium was considered by the court in
First National Bank v. United States." In exercising the last of these
powers, the trustees were directed to pay the entire interest or income
from the securities to the life beneficiary without deduction for the
amortization or recoupment of the excess of the cost or value, of the
bond when purchased over the principal amount.12 The granting of this
power was one of several provisions in the will relied on by the Government as particularly indicative of the trustees' power to invade corpus
for the benefit of the life tenant. The court found that the purpose of
giving such extraordinary powers to a trustee is to modify the general
rule regarding the fiduciary obligation to avoid discriminatory treatment of the life tenant and remainderman of a trust. 3 Thus, as in the
Miami Beach case, the court concluded that the trustees' exercise of the
powers granted to them in the will would not be limited by generally
recognized fiduciary principles and that this invasion of corpus would
make impossible an accurate valuation of the charitable remainder interest."
In Rand v. United States,'- decided by the Second Circuit, the
trustee was also the life beneficiary. The trustee was given broad powers
to manage and reinvest principal at his sole discretion in any type of
investments, to charge all operating and maintenance expenses against
trust corpus, and to loan any part or all of the trust estate to anyone,
for any purpose and on any terms. Further, the will excused the trustee
from the obligation to render periodic accounts to any court." The
district court, in granting a judgment for the taxpayer, had found that,
under Vermont law, these broad administrative powers did not permit
the trustee to deal otherwise than impartially between the life beneficiary and the charitable remaindermen. 7 The court of appeals, however,
was of the opinion that Vermont law would permit the trustee to do
exactly what he was empowered to do under the express language of the
II. 443 F.2d 480 (5th Cir. 1971).
12. Id. at 483. The court also provided an illustration of how this provision could result in
reducing corpus in favor of the life beneficiary. "At that time [date of death] he [decedent] owned
a $10,000 bond of the Standard Oil Company of Indiana. It was valued for estate tax purposes at
$11,408.33. If this bond was held until maturity and the trustees did not amortize the premium,
the corpus of the trust would suffer a loss of SI,408.33." Id.
13. Id. at 484.
14. Id. at 485.
15. 445 F.2d 1166 (2d Cir. 1971).
16. Id. at 1167.
17. Id. at 1168.
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will."8 Thus, having decided that the broad administrative powers could
be exercised by the trustee and noting that an extensive utilization of
the power to loan corpus, for example, by itself could deplete the charitable interest, the court held that the value of the remainder could not
be ascertained with any reasonable degree of certainty.
The litigation in Shafer v. United States,19 decided by the Seventh
Circuit, concerned a decedent's will that provided both a narrow and a
broad standard for invasion of corpus for the income beneficiary. Under
the former standard, the trustees could invade corpus as "shall be necessary for the care, maintenance and support"2 of the income beneficiary.
To ensure absolutely the degree of care that the testatrix intended to be
exercised for the income beneficiary, she provided the additional
standard that the "well being [of the income beneficiary] shall have
priority over every other consideration." 12 ' The district court found that
the latter standard actually determined the extent to which the trustee
could invade corpus and that it effectively nullified the definiteness of
the former provision. 22 The reasoning of the district court in denying the
deduction was adopted and approved by the Seventh Circuit in a per
curiam affirmance. The court of appeals did add, by way of dictum, a
warning to lawyers who draft charitable remainder instruments to use
their own legally precise language, rather than permitting lay clients to
23
dictate the wording.
In Jacobs v. United States,24 a charitable contribution deduction
was disallowed when the trust instrument gave the trustee broad administrative powers, allowing him to invest in wasting assets, to charge trust
expenses against principal, and to allocate cash dividends, including
capital gains dividends, to income. The trust res consisted of regulated
investment company stock. The Government argued that the trust corpus would be diminished to an indeterminate extent through the paying
18. 445 F.2d at 1169. The following quotation was relied on to support this conclusion of
the court: "A trust deed takes effect when it is made and the construction that would be given to
it at that time holds true throughout the life of the instrument. . . . The trust instrument must be
construed to give effect to the grantor's intent as manifested by the language used." 445 F.2d at
1169, citing Destitute of Bennington County v. Henry W. Putnam Memorial Hospital, 125 Vt. 289,
293, 215 A.2d 134, 137 (1965).
19. 452 F.2d 666 (7th Cir. 1971).
20. Id. at 667.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. "This case is a striking, albeit sad, illustration of the result that may well follow when a
lawyer permits a lay client to dictate wording in instruments which require legalistic precision of
meaning and which are subject to equally legalistically precise construction." 452 F.2d at 668.
24. 334 F. Supp. 388 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
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out of capital gains and retention of capital losses.25 In accepting this
contention, the District Court for the Southern District of New York
held that New York law did not provide an adequate standard by which
to ascertain the extent to which corpus would be depleted."
The most recent reported case denying a charitable deduction for
the remainder interest of a trust was decided by the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan. In DetroitBank &
Trust Co. v. United States,27 the trustees were given considerable freedom in the handling of all real and personal property belonging to the
estate. 28 They also had powers to invest in investment trusts or investment companies and to allocate receipts and disbursements between
income and principal. With respect to the last two powers, the fiduciaries' discretion was to be absolute and without regard to statutes or rules
of law to the contrary. The court held that the Michigan Revised Uniform Principal and Income Act would not prevent the trustees from
allocating receipts and disbursements between income and principal in
such a manner as the trustees themselves deemed just and equitable,
relying on a recent decision by the Michigan Supreme Court thus
construing the Act.29 The Detroit Bank court further noted that while
the courts certainly would intervene if bad faith or collusion by the
trustees were shown, the taxpayers had pointed to no Michigan decisions that required any more than that fiduciaries act in good faith. The
court thus held that the trustees were not prevented by law from exercising their powers to shift the beneficial interests in the trust, thereby
creating the possibility of a steady attrition of the trust corpus that
would render the value of the remainder not presently ascertainable.
C.

Cases Allowing the CharitableDeduction

The recent cases involving the deductibility of charitable remainders undef pre-1969 law have not all been decided against the taxpayers,
as the decision of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals in Peoples Trust
Co. v. United States 0 demonstrates. In Peoples Trust, the trustee was

given broad investment powers and was directed to consider capital gain
25. Id. at 392.
26. Id. at 393.
27. 71-2 U.S. Tax Cas.
12,821 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 30, 1971).
28. The trustees received the power "[t]o sell, exchange, convey, mortgage, lease and grant
options with respect to any and all real and personal property belonging to the estate for such
consideration as may seem fair and reasonable to the fiduciary.
... Id. at 8338.
29. Id. at 8339. The decision cited by the district court is Donovan v. National Bank, 384
Mich. 595, 185 N.W.2d 354 (1971).
30. 444 F.2d 193 (3rd Cir. 1971).
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dividends derived from mutual fund investments as income.3 1 Furthermore, the trustee was authorized to act in all circumstances as it deemed
advisable, "even though such act may not be appropriate for fiduciaries
under any statutory or other rule of law or court, but for this power."3
Recognizing that the critical issue was whether the trustee had a power
to divert corpus from the charities to the life tenant-not whether, as a
result of the trustee's investment policies, the trust corpus would at the
end of the life estate be greater or less than when the remainder interest
vested-the court felt compelled to view the trust instrument as it would
be viewed by a New Jersey. state court in relation to any power to divert
corpus.33 Contrary to the Government's contentions, the court in
Peoples Trust found neither an intention that the trustee prefer the life
beneficiary nor the absence of any legal inhibition on the trustee should
it decide to make such a preference. After a general reference to the
investment policies of mutual funds, the court stated that the clause
directing the treatment of capital gain distributions from mutual funds
as income reflected as much an intention to protect the life beneficiary
from reduction of income as an intention to prefer him over the remainderman. 34 Moreover, relying heavily on New Jersey decisional law, the
court of appeals reaffirmed the obligation of a fiduciary to deal impartially between successive trust beneficiaries, even where the provisions
of a trust agreement seek to lend finality to the fiduciary's actions.
The Peoples Trust court distinguished its recent decision in Stewart
v. Commissioner35 by noting that the trust investment in Stewart was
governed by New York law, which was held not to impose any fixed and
ascertainable standard for control of the conduct of the trustee under
the broad language of the instrument. 3 Although the FloridaBank and
the Miami Beach First National Bank decisions were cited as cases in
which the Government's contentions regarding provisions for the treatment of capital gains distributions of mutual funds, similar to the provi31. The trustee also was empowered to pay or expend for the benefit of the settlor's husband
"'such part or parts or all of the principal of the Trust Estate as it shall judge to be necessary, in
its discretion, to provide adequately for the said husband of the Settlor and for his support,
maintenance, health and needs.'" Id. at 195. The Government, however, did not contend in this
appeal that the dispositive provisions of the trust, including the power to invade corpus, rendered
the charitable remainder unascertainable. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 197.
34. Id. at 198.
35. 436 F.2d 1281 (3rd Cir. 1971).
36. 444 F.2d at 196. The Peoples Trust court stated further that "[i]f in the instant case the
trust instrument, construed as it would be in New Jersey, vested the trustee with powers to make
significant diversions from corpus, and if that power were in no way limited by the New Jersey
law, the Stewart case would control." Id.
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sion in Peoples Trust, were accepted, 37 the Third Circuit concluded that
the law of Florida regarding fiduciary obligations apparently differed
from that of New Jersey.
In allowing the charitable deduction in Estate of Toulmin v. United
States,3 the District Court for the Southern District of Ohio relied
strongly on its finding that the applicable estate law would require the
trustees to administer the trust in a manner consistent with the testator's
39
intent to leave the trust corpus to charity. Among other provisions,
the will in Toulmin contained a simple allocation clause granting the
trustees discretionary power to allocate all receipts and disbursements
between income and principal and between the separate trusts that were
established, but included no express provision authorizing the trustees
to depart in whole or in part from any rule of law. Finding no measurable standard in the decedent's will that limited the trustees' discretion
in the exercise of their administrative powers, the court felt that the
dispositive question was whether Ohio law imposed definite restrictions
on the exercise of the trustees' powers. After noting that Ohio does not
have a statute equivalent to the New York law that grants extremely
broad powers to trustees4--a statute which was the decisive factor in
the Stewart case-the Toulmin court concluded that the restrictions
imposed on the trustees by Ohio law were sufficient to make the value
of the charitable remainder presently ascertainable.
In Worcester County NationalBank v. King," the only controversy
was over the trustee's power to allocate receipts and disbursements to
corpus or income "not withstanding any rule of law. . ." 2 Relying
on earlier cases involving similar clauses, the Supreme Judicial Court
of Massachusetts held that, under Massachusetts law, this power may
not be used either to shift beneficial interests in the trust or to favor one
beneficiary over the other. Finally, the court stated that this opinion was
designed to dissolve any doubts concerning the supervision that Massachusetts courts sitting in equity will exercise over trusts containing
broadly phrased clauses on the administrative or management powers
of trustees.4 3
37.
38.
39.
1030.
40.
41.
42.
43.

Id. at 199.
326 F. Supp. 1028 (S.D. Ohio 1971).
The parts of the will that define the trustee's powers are set out in the opinion. Id. at
Id. at 1037.
268 N.E.2d 838 (Mass. 1971).
Id. at 839 (emphasis added by the court).
Id. at 841.
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In Doss v. United States,4 the District Court for the Northern
District of Texas considered a will that sought to remove state law
limitations on permissible trustee investments to allow the trustee more
flexibility in the management of the estate than the strict statutory
standards would otherwise demand. The trustee was not given a discretionary power to allocate income. The main controversy, therefore, was
over the trustee's power to invest in such wasting assets as oil, gas, and
other mineral rights and royalties. The court noted that there was nothing in the will that allowed a deviation from the standard incorporated
in the Texas Trust Act, which prevents a trustee from investing in
anything that would prove detrimental to the trust estate." The court
thus concluded that the powers granted by the will would not allow the
corpus to be depleted to the detriment of the charitable remainderman
without a violation of the trustee's fiduciary obligation. In making this
determination, the court distinguished the broader powers granted the
trustees in the trilogy of Florida cases recently decided by the Fifth
Circuit. 6 Since there was no provision in the Doss will permitting an
invasion of the remainder estate, and since no invasion power could be
derived from local law, the remainder was ascertainable and deductible.
The most recent case under pre-1969 law permitting a charitable
deduction when the trust contained an invasion of corpus provision is
the decision of the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in Greer v. United
7
States.1
The Government contended in Greer that the trustees' powers
to invest generally in any type of property in any proportion and specifically in an annuity contract for the benefit of the life beneficiary, and
to allocate and apportion expenses and receipts to principal and income
in their uncontrolled discretion, made the value of the charitable remainder presently unascertainable. 8 There were also provisions in the
will that the trustees' annual accounting need be made only to the life
beneficiary and that the trustees were to be permitted to invade corpus
to maintain the income beneficiary's standard of living. Although the
Government conceded that the latter provision was limited by an ascertainable standard,49 the court still looked to this provision to determine
the testator's intent. Noting that corpus could be invaded only after the
trustee had considered the income beneficiary's other sources of income
and principal, the court found that the decedent clearly intended to
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

326 F. Supp. 1320 (N.D. Tex. 1971).
Id. at 1325.
Id. at 1324-25.
448 F.2d 937 (4th Cir. 1971).
Id. at 944-46.
Id. at 944 (the plaintiff's previous standard of living).
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create and preserve a charitable remainder.50 The court thus held that
the specific intention embodied in the grant of the trustees' express
power limited their more general powers and, therefore, that North
Carolina law would prevent the trustees from exercising any administrative power to the detriment of the charitable remainder.
III.

LEGISLATIVE CHANGES IN

A.

1969

CongressionalPurpose

Cases decided under the old law reflect the variation in powers
given to trustees when transferors attempted to extend control over trust
property beyond the date of death so that the income beneficiaries were
protected. These different means of control used by donors interjected
an indefinite element into the determination of deductions for charitable
remainder interests. One of the criticisms of this indefiniteness was that
it sometimes resulted in unequal deductions for substantially equal charitable contributions. Consequently, Congress became dissatisfied with
the "presently ascertainable" standard for determining the allowability
of charitable deductions and considered changes in this area as part of
the Tax Reform Act of 1969.5Y

Congress wanted to eliminate substantial contingencies that might
affect the amount of the charitable remainder and also uncertainties in
the valuation of this interest. Congress, therefore, realized that there
was a need to minimize the chances of manipulation-through a trustee's selection of high-income, high-risk investments or a misuse of his
accounting power, for example-in favor of the intervening income
interest. The purpose of these changes was to achieve a better correlation between the amount of the charitable deduction and the true value
of the remainder ultimately received by charity. The legislative scheme
that was created to reach this end was designed to do away with the
familiar discretion given to a trustee to invade corpus for the benefit of
an income beneficiary, regardless of any objective standard limiting that
power. Moreover, Congress felt that any conflict between the income
and remainder interests could be ended by abolishing the necessity, for
tax purposes, of accounting for corpus and income separately.
B.

Specific Statutory Requirements

To effectuate the changes just discussed and to achieve the desired
50.

51.

Id. at 946-47.
H.R. REP. No. 91413, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 58 (1969).
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purpose of correlation, Congress created a rather rigorous format with
which gifts of charitable remainders must comply." In order to receive
the charitable deduction for federal income, gift, and estate tax purposes,53 the transfer of a remainder interest to charity must meet the
requirements of an annuity trust, unitrust, or pooled income fund. An
exception from these requirements is granted, however, for contributions of a remainder interest in a personal residence or farm, or an
undivided portion of the taxpayer's entire interest in property.
I. Annuity Trust.54-An annuity trust is a trust from which a sum
certain is paid at least annually to one or more noncharitable beneficiaries living at the creation of the trust. The specified dollar amount cannot
be less than five percent of the initial net market value of all property
placed in the trust. This amount may be expressed as a percentage of
the initial net fair market value if the governing instrument provides for
adjustment of an incorrect valuation, when the initial net fair market
value has been incorrectly determined in good faith. Moreover, the
annuity must be paid either for the life or lives of the named noncharitable beneficiary or beneficiaries or for a term not to exceed twenty
years.55 The noncharitable beneficiary cannot receive from the trust any
amount other than the stated annuity. There is also a restriction that
the governing instrument must contain a prohibition against future contributions to the annuity trust. Upon termination of the annuity pay52. The effective dates of the new provisions are as follows:
"For income tax purposes the 1969 Act applies to transfers to trusts made after July 31, 1969.
"For gift tax purposes the 1969 Act applies to transfers made after July 31, 1969.
"For estate tax purposes the 1969 Act generally applies to estates of decedents dying after
December 31, 1969. The new rules do not apply for estate tax purposes in case of property
transferred to a trust before October 10, 1969 in which an irrevocable remainder interest was given
to charity. And the new rules do not apply to property passing under a will in existence on October
9, 1969 if the testator died before October 9, 1972 without having republished his will or the testator
had no right to change his will after October 9, 1969 or the will was not republished before October
9, 1972 and the testator was incompetent on that date.
"The old rules still apply as to a trust or will executed on or before October 9, 1969 where
the decedent dies before October 9, 1972 or the will has not been republished by codicil or
otherwise." J. BEVERIDGE, TRANSFERS TO CHARITIES UNDER THE TAX REFORM AcT OF 1969, 1718 (1971).
53. The income tax deduction is provided in INT. REv. CODE OF 1954. § 170(f). The estate
and gift tax deductions are found in INT. REV.CODE OF 1954, §§ 2055(d) and 2522(c), respectively.
54. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 664(d)(1). The discussion in the text of each type of charitable remainder trust essentially paraphrases the requirements as set forth in the statute.
55. The interests of the income beneficiaries may exist concurrently or successively. For
example, a husband may create an irrevocable charitable trust, with the trust income to be paid to
himself and his wife while both are alive, then to the survivor; and, at the survivor's death, the
remainder passes to a named charity. 2 CCH 1971 STAND. FED. TAX REP.
1864.4301.
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ments, the entire remainder must be transferred to or for the use of a

charity.-6
2. Unitrust. 7-In

a unitrust, a fixed percentage of the net fair

market value of the trust assets, valued annually, is paid each year to

one or more noncharitable beneficaries living at the creation of the trust.
The fixed percentage must not be less than five percent. As in the case

of the annuity trust, the annual payout must continue for the life or lives
of the noncharitable beneficiary or beneficiaries or for a term not to
exceed twenty years. Unlike the annuity trust, however, additional contributions may be made to the trust after the initial contribution, subject
to two special rules. 8 With one exception, no amount other than the
designated percentage payout may be paid to a noncharitable beneficiary.
Under the one exception, the governing instrument can provide that
the annual distribution from the trust be either five percent of the net

fair market value of the trust assets valued annually or the amount of
trust income, whichever is lower. 9 The trust income is to be determined
under the terms of the governing instrument and applicable local law."
This alternative payout method prevents the trustee's having to invade
corpus when trust income is less than the originally designated percen-

tage. The method of payment must be set out in the governing instrument, however, and cannot be discretionary with the trustee." Following
the termination of payments to the noncharitable beneficiary under
either method, the entire remainder interest in the trust is to be trans-

ferred to or for the use of a charitable organization.
3. Pooled Income Fund.6 2-A pooled income fund is a trust set
56. For purposes of the income tax deduction, the list of qualifying charitable organizations
is found in INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 170(c). The lists of charitable organizations to which gifts
can be made that qualify for the estate and gift tax deductions are set forth in INT. REV. CODE OF
1954, §§ 2055(a), 2522(a), respectively. Subsequent references to a "charity" or "charitable organization" are intended to indicate organizations that qualify under each of these sections.
57. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 664(d)(2). See note 54 supra.
58. "(1) Where there is no valuation date after the time of the contribution, the additional
property shall be valued at the time of contribution, and
"(2) the amount payable to the beneficiary or beneficiaries shall be computed by multiplying
the fixed percentage by the sum of (a) the net fair market value of the trust's assets (excluding the
additional property as of the valuation date but including any earned income from, and any
appreciation on, such property and (b) that proportion of the value of the additional property
(excluded under (a) above) which the number of days (including the day of transfer) remaining in
the taxable year of the trust bears to the total number of days in the taxable year of the trust." 2
CCH 1971 STAND. FED. TAX REP. 1 1864.4301, at 24,230-31.
59. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 664(d)(3).
60. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 643(b).
61. Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.664-3(a)(l)(i)(b), 36 Fed. Reg. 18674 (1971).
62. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 642(c)(5). See note 54 supra.
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up by a charity, to which an individual irrevocably transfers property
and retains an income interest in the property for the life of one or more
beneficiaries living at the time of the transfer. Each person with such
an income interest must be paid annually an amount of income based
on the fund's yearly rate of return, and income cannot be accumulated
by the trust for any income beneficiary. The fund must be maintained
by the recipient charity, and no donor or income beneficiary may serve
as trustee. The fund must commingle all property transferred to it under
the above circumstances and cannot invest in tax-exempt securities. At
the termination of the income interest, the charity has a remainder
interest in the property transferred to the fund.
4. Exceptions.-Under section 170(f)(3)(B), there are two exceptions to the general rule of section 170(f)(3)(A) that no charitable contribution deduction will be allowed for transfers of less than a taxpayer's
entire interest in property, including a remainder interest, unless a charitable deduction would be allowed if the gift had been made in trust. The
first exception, and definitely the more important in terms of practical
usage, involves a remainder interest in a personal residence or farm.
Charitable deductions will be allowed, for example, when an individual
transfers his farm to charity and retains the right to live on the farm
during his life. There is a provision, however, that aside from the usual
factor to be used in discounting the remainder interest by the value of
the life estate, straight-line depreciation and depletion for the period of
the life interest must be taken into account.13 The second exception
provides for allowance of a charitable deduction for a gift of an undivided portion of a taxpayer's entire interest in property, such as an
undivided one-fourth interest in the ownership of an office building.64
C. Potentialfor Non-Correlation

Despite the rigid requirements of the tripartite statutory arrangement for charitable remainder trusts, there are some specific situations
in which the legislative purpose of a better correlation between the
deduction and the true value of the remainder interest apparently has
not been achieved. These shortcomings are attributable to several factors. First, the implementation of rigid, unfamiliar forms cannot be
expected to be accomplished without difficulties. Moreover, the fact
that final Treasury Regulations, which are essential to fill the gaps left
by the new statute if practitioners are to understand and comply with
63.

INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 170(0(4).
64. See text accompanying notes 76-78 infra.
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the requirements, have not been promulgated-except for the pooled
income fund-contributes to the creation of the situations discussed
below. Finally, there is the possibility that sufficient thought and attention were not given to structuring the statutory changes before they were
enacted, with the result that what were judged to be defects in the old
law regarding charitable remainder trusts have not yet been corrected.
1. Invasion of Corpus.-Underthe proposed regulations for the
annuity trust and unitrust, the trust cannot be subject to a power to
invade, alter, revoke, or amend for the beneficial use of any person other
than a charity. 5 These provisions are designed to eliminate the problems
that existed under the old law in valuing the charitable remainder interest when a trustee was given the power to invade corpus if the trust
income was not sufficient to meet the needs of the income beneficiary
as set forth in the trust instrument. The prohibition against invasion of
corpus, however, cannot be reconciled with the annual distribution requirements in the statute66 or with the actual operation of these trusts,
except where there is sufficient trust income to pay both expenses and
the required annuity. If the trust does not, in fact, earn net income equal
to the designated payout rate, the trustee obviously must utilize corpus
to make up the difference. The likelihood of the trust earning less than
the five percent minimum required by statute to be paid out to the
income beneficiary is reflected by the annual net earnings on invested
funds of the life insurance industry. For example, in only two years
during the period from January 1, 1931, through December 31, 1970,
has that net earnings figure equaled or exceeded five percent. 7 Consequently, except when the alternative provision to pay net income from
a unitrust is selected, the erosion of principal before the charity receives
its remainder interest is potentially serious. A simple hypothetical illustrates this point.
A unitrust was established on January 1, 1970, and funded with
stock that had a fair market value of 50,000 dollars and a basis of 25,000
dollars in the hands of the grantor, who had held the stock for more
65. Proposed Treas. Reg. §§ 1.664-2(a)(4), -3(a)(4), 36 Fed. Reg. 18673, 18675 (1971).
While this provision is not justified in light of the mandatory distribution requirements in the
statute and the actual operation of a trust, as shown by the ensuing discussion in the text, the
requirement of the regulation still must be met. To accomplish this, one writer has suggested a
prohibition against invasion of corpus, followed by the words "except such as is required to meet
the annual payments to the recipient (annuitant)." Gillon, In a Strait Jacket on the Bed of
Procrustes-CharitableRemainder Trusts Under the Tax Reform Act of 1969, 32 ALA. LAw. 243,
255 n.39 (1971).
66. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 664(d)(l)(A), (2)(A).
67. Gillon, supra note 65, at 255 & n.39a.
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than six months. During 1970, the trust earns 1,000 dollars of ordinary
income. To simplify the factual situation, the valuation date selected is
December 31, 1970, and on that date the trust assets are worth 51,000
dollars. Assuming that a five percent payout is required and that no
distributions were made during the year, the trustee is then obligated
to pay 2,550 dollars to the income beneficiary. Since the income produced by the trust is not sufficient to meet the payout requirement, the
trustee sells stock having a fair market value of 1,550 dollars and a basis
of 775 dollars, resulting in the trust's realizing a capital gain of 775
dollars. According to the tier-system character of the income rules of
section 664(b), the income beneficiary treats the distribution of 2,550
dollars as ordinary income of 1,000 dollars, capital gain of 775 dollars,
and the remaining 775 dollars as tax-free return of principal.
Some commentators have maintained that the noncharitable beneficiary's receipt of capital-gain or tax-free distributions neither lessens
the remainder interest nor violates the legislative intent of correlating
the deduction with the remainder interest received by charity. 8 This
position seems well founded in cases in which the trust instrument has
a required payout of more than the six percent rate of return that is
assumed for charitable remainder trusts in the regulations.69 In such
cases, the grantor's charitable deduction is computed on the theory that
some principal will be repaid to the income beneficiary, because of the
difference in the designated payout rate and the assumed rate of return.
Under these conditions, the charity admittedly has no reason to expect
an amount precisely equal to the amount originally contributed to the
charitable remainder trust. 0 Accordingly, the amount of the charitable
deduction is reduced proportionately by the amount of principal expected to be repaid, and the desired correlation is maintained. When a
unitrust instrument provides for an annual payout of an amount equal
to five percent of the trust assets valued annually, as in the above
hypothetical, this position seems more vulnerable. The combined distribution of capital gains and trust corpus necessitated by the minimum
68. E.g., Morrison & Marcus, supra note 1, at 232.
69. Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-10 (1970) (annuity trust); Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.6644(a)(l)(i), 36 Fed. Reg. 18676 (1971) (unitrust). For a pooled income fund, the rate of return used
in valuing the remainder interest is a rate equal to the highest yearly rate of return of the fund for
the 3 taxable years immediately preceding its taxable year in which the transfer of property to the
fund is made. If a pooled income fund has been in existence for less than 3 taxable years, however,
the highest yearly rate of return shall be deemed to be 6 percent. Treas. Reg. § 1.642(c)-6(b)(2)
(1971).
70. For a hypothetical example illustrating this point see Morrison & Marcus, supra note
1, at 232 n.197.
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five percent payout provision clearly lessens the charitable remainder
interest and violates the desired correlation. There was no reason to
assume any repayment of principal in computing the grantor's deduction, since the designated payout rate was only five percent. Moreover,
in a unitrust with a five percent or greater payout provision, the possibility of a rapid reduction of corpus is particularly acute when the trust is
created during a bear market, and the payout continues after the value
of the corpus has increased considerably, from a subsequent rise in the
market. If the trust is still earning approximately the same amount of
income as when it was first established, the increase in the amount to
be paid out to the noncharitable beneficiary, resulting from a higher
valued corpus on which the percentage distribution is based, will have
to come from corpus.
While the alternative unitrust payout method of distributing only
trust income if the income is less than the amount determined under the
standard five percent formula 7' preserves corpus, this formula does not
give the annuitant a guarantee of sufficient income in years in which the
trust has little or no earnings. Corpus can be protected by this method,
therefore, only when the settlor is reasonably satisfied that the needs of
the noncharitable beneficiary will be met by the expected annual yield
of the unitrust. This alternative unitrust payout method also revives
another problem that the changes of the 1969 Act were designed to
eliminate.
2. Determinationof "Trust Income. "--Because of the valuation
problems resulting from a trustee's having the power to allocate items
between income and principal under the old law, the 1969 Act undertook to do away with this discretionary accounting power. The solution
was to eliminate distinctions between the two accounts by providing that
the amounts to be paid out were to be a "sum certain," in the case of
an annuity trust, 72 and a "fixed percentage," in the case of a unitrust. 73
The alternative unitrust payout method, however, refers to "trust income" as the amount to be distributed to the income beneficiary. Section 643(b) defines trust income for purposes of the alternative payout
method and provides that this item is to be determined under the terms
of the governing instrument and applicable local law. It is clear, therefore, that section 643(b) revives the traditional division of principal and
income and the traditional problems of balancing the interests of the
71.
72.
73.

INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 664(d)(3)(A).
INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 664(d)(1)(A).
INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 664(d)(2)(A).
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beneficiary and the remainderman, which are the very problems that the
unitrust was designed to solve.74
D.

Unresolved Problem Areas

Aside from the instances in which the congressional goal of correlating the amount of the charitable deduction with the value of the
remainder interest seemingly has not been reached, specific problems
have arisen in drafting and administering charitable remainder trust
instruments that are not answered adequately by the 1969 Act or the
proposed regulations. The problems in arriving at satisfactory regulations may be seen as a reflection of poor draftsmanship in the Act itself
and the intransigent stand being taken by the Treasury Department and
the Internal Revenue Service regarding deductions for charitable remainder trusts." Thus, a discussion of these specific problems hopefully
will aid in stressing the need for their urgent individual resolution in the
regulations or, if that alternative should prove infeasible, perhaps it will
further serve to point up the need to reconsider the statutory changes
in their entirety.
1. Determination of a Taxpayer's "Undivided Interest."--Under

section 170(f)(3)(A), the charitable deduction is denied for certain contributions of partial interests in property. An exception to this general
rule is found in section 170(f)(3)(B)(ii), permitting the deduction for the
contribution of an undivided portion of the taxpayer's entire interest in
property. The distinction between the conveyance of an undivided interest and some other interest that is less than the grantor's entire interest,
however, is not always drawn easily. 76 One specific example provided by
the congressional conferees is that the gift of an open space easement
in gross is a gift of an undivided interest when the easement is in perpetuity.77 In light of this statement, the suggestion has been made that the
principal test for determining a gift of an undivided interest is whether
the interests of the contributor and charity, although not required to be
identical in all respects, are of the same duration. 71 While such suggestions are helpful in the drafting of instruments, there is a distinct need
74. See Morrison & Marcus, supra note 1, at 216.
75. See, e.g., Fleming, Charitable Trusts Under the Tax Reform Act, 48 TAXES 757, 762
(1970).
76. Sneed, The Effect of the '69 Revenue Act on CharitableGiving to EducationalInstitutions: CharitableRemainder Trusts, Pooled Income Funds and Other Problems, 5 MIAMI INST.
71.1803.1 (1971).
ON EST. PLAN. ch. 71-18,
77. H.R. REP. No. 91-782, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 294 (1969).
78. Sneed, supra note 76.

19721

CHARITABLE REMAINDER TRUST REFORM

1043

for a definitive statement on this point in the regulations. An additional
problem arises when the taxpayer's entire interest is only a partial interest such as a life estate or a remainder interest. Although the term
"entire interest" does not seem to require a fee simple-in which case
the taxpayer should be entitled to a deduction even though he contributes only a partial interest-this is another matter that has not yet been
addressed directly in the proposed regulations.
2. Alternative Payout Method of Section 664(d)(3).-Because of
a conflict between the statute and the proposed regulations, there is also
some uncertainty regarding the unitrust payout provision in section
664(d)(3). The 1969 Act provides that under this formula the trustee
must make up any deficiency between the sum actually paid and the five
percent share in later years when the trust income exceeds five percent.
For example, if a unitrust earned only three percent in 1970, the trustee,
pursuant to the alternative payout method, would be required to distribute only the three percent income actually earned. If the trust were to
earn income at a six percent rate in 1971 and 1972, the trustee would
be required by the statute to distribute the one percent "surplus" for
each of the last two years to make up the two percent deficiency from
1970. Despite this clear statutory provision, the proposed regulations
state that such deficiencies do not have to be made up, indicating that
the additional make-up provision is optional.79 This conflict naturally
has caused considerable disagreement among writers in this area on how
much discretion trustees have in making distributions under the alternative payout method when trust income rises from below to above the
five percent level.80 The importance of resolving this uncertainty can be
shown by a trustee's doubt, when the governing intrument is silent
regarding this aspect of his duties, whether he is obligated to pay out
unitrust income in excess of five percent because income was earned at
a lesser percentage in prior years. The trustee presumably could be
surcharged for failing to make this distribution if such a duty were
found to be imposed by law.
79. Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.664-3(a)(1)(i)(b), 36 Fed. Reg. 18674 (1971).
80. Several writers have taken the view that a trustee is required to make up any deficiency
in later years. E.g., Swados, Charitable Remainder Trusts-Draftingand Valuation Guidelines,
N.Y.U. 29TH INST. ON FED. TAX. 2023, 2042 (1971); Turley, CharitableDeductions, Remainders
to Charity. and the Tax Reform Act, 8 HOUSTON L. REV. 411, 427 (1971). Other commentators
support the position that such make-up provisions are optional. E.g., Accumulation Trusts and
CharitableRemainder Trusts, S. CAL. 23RD INST. ON FED. TAX. 501, 550-51 (1971). At least one
member of the former group, Robert 0. Swados, has recanted his published opinion and adopted
the latter position in a recent private conversation. Interview with Robert L. Edwards, Attorney,
in Winston-Salem, N.C., Dec. 28, 1971.
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ADMINISTRATIVE AND POLICY CONSIDERATIONS

Besides the instances which indicate that the 1969 changes regarding charitable remainder trusts perhaps have not attained their ultimate
goal and the specific problems that as yet remain unresolved, there are
a number of policy considerations that cast doubt upon the effectiveness
of the new law. This discussion is intended to demonstrate the level of
dissatisfaction with the recent legislation among those persons who must
utilize it daily and to point out the possible need for further revision.
While criticisms undoubtedly arise whenever there is a revision of the
law as significant as that made by the Tax Reform Act, the points
discussed below weigh particularly strongly, not merely because of their
number, but also because of their emphasis on establishing a more
viable structure to coordinate the needs of society and the governing tax
law. In the area of charitable giving, such coordination is essential.
Moreover, in achieving this coordination, policy values are as important
in deciding upon the applicable law as are the purely technical reasons
for change.
A.

The Mandatory Distribution Requirement

Congress added a rather illogical quirk to the law by requiring that
the sum certain, in the case of an annuity trust, or the fixed percentage,
in the case of a unitrust, distributed to the noncharitable beneficiary be
not less than five percent of the value of the trust assets.81 This provision
creates the puzzling situation in which a retained five percent interest
permits the settlor to obtain a charitable deduction, but a retained four
percent income interest produces no charitable deduction. In effect, a
donor is penalized for attempting to be beneficient by retaining a
smaller interest for himself or his designated income beneficiaries. This
result apparently was intended by Congress, as an outgrowth of a belief
that charitable remainder trusts and private foundations should be given
the same treatment.82 Admittedly, charitable remainder trusts are subject to many of the requirements and restrictions imposed on private
foundations.8 3 Therefore, the grantor will be allowed a charitable con81. Moore, Estate Planning Under the Tax Reform Act of 1969: The Uses of Charity, 56
VA. L. REV. 565, 585 (1970).
82. Id. "Sen. Fin. Rpt., H.R. 13270, Charitable Contributions, Item 6:'... [Tlrusts generally are subject to the same requirements and restrictions imposed on private foundations, since
to the extent of the charitable interest, their use achieves the same result.'" Fleming, supra note
75, at 757 n.2.
83. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 4947(a)(2). This subsection, however, applies to the charitable remainder trust only during the period the trust is administered for private persons. See Treas.
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tribution deduction, and the trust will be exempt from the taxes imposed
by Subtitle D of Chapter 42 of the Code, only if the trust instrument
contains certain express prohibitions.84 Moreover, Congress seemingly

felt that if tax-exempt private foundations are to be required to distribute annually a fixed percentage of their assets or adjusted net income, 5
a like requirement should be imposed on charitable remainder unitrusts
and annuity trusts.8 The imposition of this uniform treatment by Congress has been criticized because it fails to deal with an essential distinc-

tion between distributions by private foundations and charitable remainder trusts.8 7 Whereas amounts distributed by a private foundation are
devoted currently to charitable use, distributions by a charitable remainder unitrust or annuity trust to an income beneficiary probably never
Reg. § 53.4947-1(c)(1)(i). From the first date upon which one of the provisions of Treas.
Reg. § 53.4947(b)(2) is satisfied, INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 4947(a)(1) shall apply to the trust.
Moreover, under INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 4947(a)(2)(A), the requirements of Int. Rev. Code
of 1954, § 4947(a)(2) are made "inapplicable to any amounts payable under the terms of a splitinterest trust to income beneficiaries, unless a deduction was allowed under section 170(f)(2)(B),
2055(e)(2)(B), or 2522(c)(2)(B) with respect to the income interest of any such beneficiary." Treas.
Reg. § 53.4947-1(c)(2). In the case of a charitable remainder trust, in which the trust income is
payable to noncharitable beneficiaries, there obviously is no charitable deduction for the distribution of the income interest.
84. "A charitable remainder trust is considered a split-interest trust under § 4947(a)(2), and
therefore its governing instrument must contain certain provisions required under § 508(e) as if it
were a private foundation. [footnote citation to Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.664-1(b), 36 Fed. Reg.
18669 (1971)] § 4947(b)(3)(B) states that the § 4943 (excess business holdings) and § 4944 (investments which jeopardize charitable purpose) restrictions shall not apply to a split-interest trust
if a charitable deduction is allowed for the gift of the remainder interest . . . .Thus, the trust's
governing instrument must only prohibit the trust from engaging in any act of self-dealing (§ 4941)
and from making any taxable expenditures (§ 4945)." Charitable Remainder Trusts-Required
Governing Instrument Provisions, BNA Tax Management Memo. No. 72-04, at 10 (Feb. 21,
1972). "The escape from the full impact of the private foundation rules, however, may be illusory
in the case of a charitable remainder trust, for the Senate Committee Report makes the point
explicitly that 'in the latter case [the sole charitable interest being that of the remainderman] the
stock ownership and speculative investment requirements are to become applicable at the time the
remainder interest of charity comes into possession.' [footnote citation to S.REP. No. 91-552, 91st
Cong., IstSes. 94 (1969)]" Swados, supra note 80, at 2059. Moreover, when the noncharitable
income expires, and the trust becomes subject to INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 4947(a)(1), all of the
provisions of § 508(e), as well as the substantive requirements of §§4943 and 4944, become
applicable. Thus, there must be a ban on accumulation of income by the trustee if the corpus is
not distributed upon termination of the noncharitable interest but is retained by the trust for the
charitable use, a requirement that does not exist when §§ 664 and 4947(a)(2) are read together.
Id. at 2059-60 & n.65.
It has been advised that the trust instrument include the restrictions of §§ 4943 and 4944 from
the outset, since in the case of a testamentary charitable remainder trust, it would be impossible
to insert these provisions at the expiration of the noncharitable income interest. Id. at 2060.
85. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 4942(d)(1). See H.R. REP. No.91-782,91st Cong., 1st Sess.
281 (1969).
86. Moore, supra note 81.
87. Id.
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will be used by or for a charity. This flaw in the apparent reasoning for
imposing the particular payout requirements on charitable remainder
trusts points up the lack of logic in denying the charitable deduction to
a donor who wants to make an increased contribution by retaining an
income interest of less than five percent.
B.

Depreciation Factorfor PersonalResidences and Farms

Another provision that is difficult to understand in the context of
a tax law presumably designed to promote charitable contributions as
well as equity among taxpayers relates to gifts of remainder interests in
personal residences and farms. In section 170(f)(3)(B)(ii), Congress
acceded to the requests of charities-educational institutions in particular 8 -- and retained this popular form of giving without imposing the
rigorous requirements of a charitable remainder trust. This beneficence
is not as generous as it may first appear, however, because of the factors
that must be considered in valuing the remainder interest. First, there
is a requirement that straight-line depreciation and depletion, computed
for the period of the retained life estate, be taken into account in determining the value of the remainder."9 That value then must be discounted
at the usual rate of six percent per annum, again for the number of years
attributable to the life estate as determined by the annuity tables.
The fundamental assumption of the requirement to consider depreciation in valuing the remainder interest, and accordingly the charitable
deduction, is that the value of the residence or farm when received by
charity will be less than at the time the deduction is taken. The fallacy
in this assumption is the impossibility of predicting future events. Moreover, it should be remembered that making a depreciation adjustment
is strictly an accounting technique, to be used for the purpose of amortizing the cost of an asset, and is not recognized as a means of determining the actual future market value of the asset being depreciated. Depending of course on the location and particular physical characteristics
of the residence or farm, there is the possibility of an actual increase in
value, perhaps considerable, by the time the charity receives its remainder. Thus, the point to be made is that, while depreciation perhaps is a
factor to be taken into account, it is not the only factor that should be
recognized. If an expert appraisal of the potential increase in the value
of the property during the period of the life interest is not deemed
88.
pt. 3, at
89.
90.

See Hearings on H.R. 13270 Before the Senate Finance Comm., 91st Cong., Ist Sess..
2185-257 (1969).
INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 170(0(4).
Id.
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feasible-for example, because of the anticipated length of the life estate
in a particular case-then consideration should be given to some
alternative fairer than merely discounting the value of the remainder
interest by two factors for purposes of the charitable deduction.
C. Lack of Flexibility
1. Use of Multiple Trusts.-A common criticism of the 1969 Act

involves the overall lack of flexibility in the requirements for charitable
remainder trusts. Estate planners maintain that too often a multiplicity
of trusts is now necessary to carry out the grantor's wishes, whereas a
single, more familiar, and simpler form of trust was available prior to
19 6 9 .

1

An illustration of the apparently increased need to use multiple

trusts, and the accompanying necessity of additional expense, is shown
by a difference in the requirements for the charitable remainder unitrust
and the annuity trust. The proposed regulations permit additional contributions to a unitrust, if the governing instrument includes provisions
designating a valuation date for the added property and an adjustment
92
to the payout rate that takes the additional contributions into account.
In the case of an annuity trust, however, the governing instrument must
include a specific provision that no future contributions may be made
to the trust after it is established. 3 A donor utilizing the annuity trust
format, therefore, must form additional trusts whenever he wishes to
increase his gift to a particular charity. This need for other trusts could
have the effect of discouraging charitable contributions after the donor
weighs the expense and trouble of establishing a separate trust arrangement against the value, in philanthropic and economic terms, of making
the charitable gift.
Another example of the rigid structure of the 1969 requirements
and the increased need for a multiplicity of trusts is the exclusion of
noncharitable beneficiaries from sharing in the remainder interest.94 The
rationale of Congress for eliminating noncharitable beneficiaries as discretionary or contingent beneficiaries of corpus is clear, since an accurate valuation of the charity's interest would be impossible if such contingencies existed. The suggestion has been made, however, that it
91. See, e.g., Peter, An Analytical Comparison of the Three Split-Interest CharitableTrust
Vehicles, 35 J. TAX. 240, 242 (1971).
92. Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.664-3(b), 36 Fed. Reg. 18675 (1971).
93. Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.664-2(b), 36 Fed. Reg. 18673 (1971).
94. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 642(c)(5)(A), 664(d)(1)(C), (2)(C). Treas. Reg. § 1.642(c)5(b)(8); Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.664-2(a)(6), 36 Fed. Reg. 18673 (1971); Proposed Treas.
Reg. § 1.664-3(a)(6), 36 Fed. Reg. 18675 (1971).
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probably was not necessary to preclude the noncharitable beneficiaries
from sharing a vested remainder with charity on a fractional basis, in
which case the charitable and noncharitable interests still could be defined.915 Nevertheless, the requirement remains that, at the termination
of all income interests, the entire corpus must be irrevocably transferred
to or for the use of a charitable organization." There is therefore a need
to create separate inter vivos or testamentary trusts, with the remainder
interest in one trust designated solely for charity, whenever a donor
desires to divide what would otherwise be a single remainder interest
between private beneficiaries, and a charity. Moreover, the rather common practice of directing gifts to third parties following the death of the
testator and his spouse prior to the passing of a remainder to charity is
no longer possible unless multiple trusts are used.97 It again seems that
a less rigorous requirement, permitting fractional sharing in a vested
remainder, for example, might have been used without sacrificing the
desired objective of eliminating uncertainty generated by contingent
transfers.
2. Inapplicability of Alternative Payout Method to the Annuity
Trust.-Although uncertainties regarding the alternative payout provision for the charitable remainder unitrust' 8 already have been discussed
to some extent, 99 there is the further question of why this provision was
not extended to apply to the annuity trust. The Senate did, in fact, relax
the nearly "debt" character of the income interest by permitting the
alternative payout arrangement in both the unitrust and the annuity
trust and providing that deficiencies resulting from a drop in trust income below the stated amount payable could be made up in later years
when income exceeded this amount. 10 The Senate noted that, by allowing the income payout alternative, there could be greater flexibility in
the making of charitable gifts while still protecting against abuse of the
charitable deduction.' In light of this purpose, it is not surprising that
the logic behind the congressional conference committee's decision to
make this flexibility applicable only to unitrusts has been attacked. The
point has been made that, since in both types of trust the remainder
must be valued on the assumption that at least a five percent interest is
to be distributed annually, an investment policy reducing the trust in95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.

71.1803.1.
Sneed, supra note 76, at
See note 94 supra.
Haberman, Trusts and the Tax Reform Act, 54 MARQ. L. REV. 117, 120 (1971).
INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 664(d)(3).
See notes 79-80 supra and accompanying text.
S. REP. No. 91-552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 89 (1969).
Id. at 90.
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come and accordingly the annuitant's return to below five percent would
not seem to be detrimental to the interests of the remainderman or the
Government.' Moreover, invasions of corpus would not be necessary
since payouts would be limited to actual income of the annuity trust if
less than the designated dollar annuity. These observations, in addition
to the need for greater flexibility under the new law, support an extension of the alternative payout method to the annuity trust.
D.

Overall Complexity of the Statute

The examples of decreased flexibility and the accompanying need
to use multiple trusts reflect the rigidity and complexity that pervade
the charitable remainder provisions of the 1969 Act. There are more
than fifteen statutory provisions that must be considered in deciding the
type and form of gift and the amount of charitable contribution deduction that is available. 103 The basic inquiry of persons attempting to
utilize these provisions as donors, attorneys, or charitable donees is why
such strictures were thought necessary to achieve reform.' Critics who
were comfortable in the ways of the old law are disappointd with the
movement away from the traditional and well understood concept of
dividing a trust into income and remainder interests. While changes
almost certainly were needed to obtain a better correlation between the
charitable deduction and the value of the remainder interest actually
received by charity, the desired result could have been reached more
easily through the adoption of much simpler statutory changes.
The complexities of the recent legislation and particularly the response of practitioners point up the need for a sample document that
satisfies the requirements of the statute and the Treasury Department.
While the Treasury reportedly has stated that a revenue ruling or procedure containing such a document is being developed, the ruling has not
yet been published and should be given a high priority." 5 The need for
such a document is further accentuated by the allegation that some of
the governing instrument requirements in the proposed regulations find
no support in the statute.' Thus, aside from the problems created by
the statute itself, critics can point out that final regulations still have not
been promulgated to implement the statute, and that current proposed
71.1801.2.
102. Sneed, supra note 76, at
103. Swados, supra note 80, at 2025-26 n.1 (excellent summary of provisions).
104. E.g., Fleming, supra note 75.
105. Covey, Estate, Gift and Income Taxation-1970 Developments, 5 MIANi INST. ON EST.
71.122.7 (1971).
71,100, at
PLAN ch. 71-1,
106. Id.
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regulations definitely are not adequate.
Another argument directed against the complexities of the new law
is the doubt that the increased assurance of correlation, aside from being
less than complete in light of the problems already discussed, is worth
the increased cost and inconvenience." 7 While the magnitude of these
costs is not yet ascertained, they nevertheless are a concern of both
donors and donees. For the donors, there are increased expenses in
structuring their gifts to meet the needs of their chosen charitable and
noncharitable beneficiaries in accordance with the new law. For charitable donees, the technicalities of the new rules, especially those governing
the pooled income fund, have increased the costs of obtaining and administering contributions. Consequently, in addition to the potentially
negative reaction by contributors to the stringencies of the 1969 Act and
the indirect effect of that reaction on charities, charitable organizations
themselves are suffering directly from increased expenses made necessary by the new law.
V.

A.

PROPOSED CHANGES

Changes Within the Framework of the 1969 Act

1. Alternative Payout Method for Annuity Trust.-Within the
context of the tripartite arrangements for charitable remainder trusts in
the 1969 Act, one possible change would be to extend the alternative
payout provision of distributing only trust income, if less than the designated payout,0 8 to the annuity trust. This change would allow some
flexibility in the distribution requirements for the annuity trust and, at
the same time, serve the additional function of preserving corpus for
charity.
Besides supporting the extension of the alternative payout method
to the annuity trust, the Senate, in its deliberations on the 1969 Tax
Reform Act, adopted a provision to permit deficiencies resulting from
a decline in trust income below the required annual distribution to be
made up in later years in which there is a surplus of trust income over
the required distribution."0 9 This procedure would tend to equate total
distributions over several years under the alternative method with the
results that would have been reached if the sum certain specified in the
107. E.g., Sneed, supra note 76, at 1 71.1801.1.
108. The alternative payout method for the unitrust is found in INT. REV. CODE OF
1954, § 664(d)(3).
109. S. REP. No. 91-552, 91st Cong., Ist Sess. 89 (1969). See text accompanying notes 10002 supra.
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annuity trust instrument had, in fact, been distributed each year. Moreover, the increased correlation between the deduction allowed and the
actual value of the remainder implicit in this procedure would achieve
a more equitable result for the taxpayer. The theory underlying the
alternative payout provision is the protection of charity; the addition of
a "make-up" provision secures this objective, and additionally, ensures
that the income beneficiary will not receive less than the designated
payout if there is surplus income from which payment may be made
without reducing the charitable remainder. Whether or not the trustee
is allowed to make up deficiencies in this manner, the important point
is that he would never have to invade corpus. Thus, the donor who is
interested primarily in assuring that his selected charity receives an
undepleted remainder interest likely would be attracted to the alternative payout method. Unfortunately, under the current law, such donors
have this alternative only with respect to the unitrust. For these reasons,
a provision similar to that found in section 664(d)(3) should be extended
to apply to the annuity trust.
2. FractionalDivision of Remainder Interests.-Another change
that might be effected within the charitable remainder trust framework
of the 1969 Act would be permitting noncharitable beneficiaries to share
in the remainder interest. Under current law, the entire corpus must be
irrevocably transferred to or for the use of a charitable organization at
the termination of all income interests. " A donor, therefore, is denied
the flexibility of designating members of his family or other specified
noncharitable beneficiaries to share the remainder with charity. It seems
feasible, however, to permit the charitable and noncharitable beneficiaries to share the remainder on a fractional basis. The donor, of course,
would receive no charitable deduction for the portion of the remainder
to be taken by the noncharitable beneficiary. The charitable deduction
thus might first be computed as if a charity were to receive the entire
remainder, as is the case under current law. The amount of this deduction then could be reduced proportionately by the fractional share of the
remainder that the donor had designated for a noncharitable beneficiary. For example, if under a typical unitrust arrangement, it were shown
that the donor would receive a forty thousand dollar charitable deduction but for the fact that he had granted a one-fourth interest in the
remainder to his son, this deduction simply could be reduced to thirty
thousand dollars. Then, at the conclusion of the distributions to the
income beneficiaries, the son would receive a one-fourth interest in the
110.

INT. REv. CODE OF 1954,

§;

642(c)(5), 664(d)(1)(c), (2)(c).
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remainder, whatever its value actually might be at that time. This type
of provision, permitting fractional sharing in the remainder, would
allow the donor flexibility in the use of the charitabld remainder trust,
instead of requiring him to set up two separate trusts-one in the usual
charitable remainder form and the other for the benefit of those persons
who would be permitted to receive a fractional share of the charitable
remainder if the aforementioned changes were implemented.
B.

Modification of the Pre-1969 CharitableRemainder Trust

1. Rationale.-In expressing the general reasons for changes in
the law applicable to charitable remainder trusts, the House Ways and
Means Committee stated that the pre-1969 law for determining charitable deductions for gifts of remainder interests does "not necessarily have
any relation to the value of the benefit which charity receives .. .
because the trust assets may be invested in a manner so as to maximize
the income interest .

.

""

The committee thus felt that there was a

possibility that a charity may ultimately receive a remainder interest of
a value less than that used by the donor to determine the amount of his
deduction. The supposition inherent in these statements of the committee, however, is that the trustee will follow an investment policy that
discriminates in favor of the income beneficiary of a charitable remainder trust. This assumption violates the prudent man rule of basic trust
law that a trustee must make only those investments that are consistent
with his dual obligation to produce income and preserve capital."'
Moreover, if a trustee violates this duty, those persons whose interests
are violated have a remedy against the trustee in the state courts.
A further indication that this part of the rationale supporting the
1969 changes is based more on hypothesis than on fact is found in the
Tax Reform Study prepared by the Treasury Department. This study
recommended changes involving "generally available abuse situations." 3 The mere opportunity for abuse, however, does not mean that
abuse actually will occur, especially in light of the effective remedy
available under state trust law. Moreover, the study went on the note
that "it is impossible accurately to calculate the extent of [actual abuse
in these situations]. It is unlikely that the correction of these abuses will
have a significant revenue effect.""' This statement strongly intimates
III.
112.
3, at 2245
113.
114.

H.R. REP. No. 91-41e, 91st Cong., IstSess., pt. 1, at 58-59 (1969).
Hearings on H.R. 13270 Before the Senate Finance Comm., 91st Cong., 1st Sess., pt.
(1969).
TREAS. DEP'T, TAX REFORM STUDIES AND PROPOSALS 185 (1969).
Id.
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that improper use of charitable remainder trusts was not in fact widespread and, therefore, that the postulate underlying this portion of the
House committee report was not supported by actual evidence.
Because of the apparently scant evidence of abuse in this area, the
1969 Act often has been termed an excessive response to whatever inequities existed under the old law. Moreover, one article has suggested
that the favored tax status of charitable remainder trusts prior to the
1969 Act was more apparent than real because charitable trusts were
questioned and attacked continually by the Treasury Department."' In
light of these comments, it appears that a return to some form of the
familiar arrangement of a gift to charity as trustee to pay the income
to the donors for life, with a legal remainder to the charity, might be
feasible.
2. Elimination of Contingent Remainders and Powers To Invade
Corpus.-The purpose of any modifications in the traditional trust concept would be to eliminate the possibility of a charitable deduction that
is substantially in excess of the amount charity may ultimately receive
and, at the same time, to avoid the rigid and rather arbitrary forms of
a unitrust or dollar annuity trust. This purpose could be accomplished
by first expressly disallowing a deduction for the gift of a contingent
remainder interest. This provision would apply whenever there is a possibility that all or part of the remainder interest will not vest in the
designated charity. A second modification, still within the familiar
framework of the pre-1969 law, would be to prohibit a deduction for a
charitable remainder trust that is subject to any power to invade corpus
for any purpose."' This change would compel the donor to fund the
charitable remainder trust on the basis of his careful prior evaluation
of the needs of the income beneficiary, instead of leaving that evaluation
to the discretion of the trustee. This requirement does not seem unduly
harsh or difficult since the donor would have several planning alternatives available, such as increasing the amount of trust corpus in order
to provide greater income for the beneficiary or making additional arrangements for the benefit of the income beneficiary that would satisfy
his needs by supplementing the income from the charitable remainder
trust. The simplicity of this change is particularly appealing. It would
eliminate the sort of litigation that is still continuing under the pre-1969
law on whether the trustee's power of invasion is limited by a "presently
ascertainable" standard. Perhaps the most favorable aspect of all is that
115.

Morrison & Marcus, supra note 1, at 233.

116. See Hearingson H.R. 13270 Before the Senate FinanceComm., 91st Cong., Ist Sess.,
pt. 3, at 2236, 2245 (1969).
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the familiar arrangement of income to the donor for life, remainder to
charity, would be preserved; this plan, together with the fiduciary obligations imposed by state trust law, would correlate the amount of charitable deduction with the value of the charitable remainder.
3. CharitableDonee As the Only Permissible Trustee.-A second
means of preserving the familiar trust concept as it existed prior to the
1969 Act would be to require that gifts of remainder interests in trust
be made only to the charity itself as trustee. 17 While the charity was
typically the trustee of a charitable remainder trust created under the
old law, this change would rule out the possibility of designating other
trustees. The details of this requirement would be similar to the limitations found in section 642(c)(5)(E) and the regulations thereunder, regarding persons eligible to serve as a trustee of a pooled income fund.
The purpose of this requirement is to respond to the reasons for change
expressed by Congress in 1969118 by ensuring an investment policy that
does not favor the donor at the expense of the charitable remainder. The
underlying assumption of this solution is, of course, that a charity would
not advocate an investment policy that is detrimental to its own selfinterest. This solution would also preserve the availability of a flexible
investment policy to take advantage of fluctuating interest rates and
varying investment opportunities. While it is obvious that this arrangement would protect the charitable remainderman, there is the possibility
of discrimination against the income beneficiary. This potential for
"reverse discrimination," which could result in the donor's obtaining a
deduction that is less than the value of the remainder received by charity, does not receive the attention in the legislative history of the 1969
Act that its counterpart does. If a charity follows an investment policy
that accentuates the remainder at the expense of the income interest,
however, the income beneficiary would have a remedy under state trust
law.
Although it would protect the interest of the charitable remainderman, this modification of the pre-1969 law might not be sufficient alone
to permit an accurate valuation of the remainder interest for purposes
of the charitable deduction. It may be necessary, therefore, to combine
the proposal to have the charitable donee as the only possible trustee
with the aforementioned recommendation to deny powers of invasion
in charitable remainder trusts.
117.
118.

Id. at 2068.
See note I11 supra.

19721

CHARITABLE REMAINDER TRUST REFORM
VI.

1055

CONCLUSION

The proposals offered in this Note are meant to suggest that a
return to some form of the flexible, well understood charitable remainder trust of pre-1969 days would prove most satisfactory to the needs
of donors, charities, and attorneys. With modifications similar to those
recommended above, the familiar concept of traditional income and
remainder interests could be reinstated, with its weaknesses eliminated.
If reversion to an improved form of the old law is deemed unacceptable,
it nevertheless appears that a revision of the tripartite structure of the
1969 Act is mandatory. The complexity and lack of flexibility inherent
in the new requirements, together with the several instances in which the
desired correlation between deduction and actual remainder value has
not been attained, illustrate the necessity for technical improvements in
the statute. The effectiveness of any legislation that contains the potential for restricting charitable contributions and thereby making the support of charitable organizations a governmental, rather than a private,
function must be reappraised constantly. For these reasons, it is hoped
that relief from the mechanical strictures governing charitable remainder trusts under the Tax Reform Act of 1969 soon will be forthcoming.
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